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Abstract: This article utilises a case study of the problem of secondhand smoke in enclosed 
public places to examine economic and political solutions to social problems. The responses 
of economic actors to this problem are examined via analysis of a number of pre-existing 
case studies of private arrangements in bars and restaurants prior to the introduction of 
smoking bans. The responses of political actors are examined via a study of the legislative 
process that led to the ban on smoking in enclosed public places introduced in England in 
2007.  This empirical evidence supports the view that economic decision-making leads to a 
plurality of different accommodations of different preferences suggestive of inter-subjective 
learning, whereas political decision-making leads to exclusive, all-or-nothing solutions 
indicative of an adversarial approach to decision-making and the imposition of one group’s 
preferences on the whole population.  
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1. Introduction 
 
People encounter social problems as both economic and political actors: as producers and 
consumers in private markets they may entrepreneurially establish business enterprises, 
make purchasing decisions that allocate resources to such enterprises and/or voluntarily 
agree to codes of self-regulation in order to solve social problems; as citizens in democratic 
states they may vote for regulatory or legislative interventions and/or hold political or 
bureaucratic office that involves the administration of government enterprises that similarly 
aim to ameliorate social problems.  
 
This article is concerned with how the responses to social problems that emerge from 
economic and political processes differ. There is an established view in political science that 
political institutions are more likely to produce effective solutions to social problems 
because they encourage reflective deliberation on the values and preferences of others, 
whereas economic processes are said to encourage more self-regarding, self-interested and 
hedonistic behaviour. The former is thought more likely to lead to the discovery of effective 
solutions to social problems than the latter. This view has been challenged by political 
economists working within (what might be termed) subjectivist political economy who 
argue that it is in fact economic processes that encourage inter-subjective learning and 
political processes that engender an unreflective and more adversarial approach to 
decision-making. 
 
The article will examine these issues via a case study of economic and political solutions to 
the problem of secondhand smoke in enclosed public places, a problem that offers the 
opportunity to investigate both political and economic responses to the same phenomenon. 
The response of economic actors to the problem of secondhand will be examined via a 
number of published case studies of the arrangements for smokers and non-smokers in bars 
and restaurants prior to the introduction of smoking bans (Boyes and Marlow, 1996; 
Dunham and Marlow, 2000a, 2000b, 2004). To understand the response of political actors 
to the problem of secondhand smoke two key stages in the legislative process that led to 
the smoking ban introduced in England on 1 July 2007 will be examined: the inquiry into 
smoking in enclosed public places undertaken by the House of Commons Health Select 
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Committee in 2005 and the debate on the legislation in the House of Commons on 14 
February 2006. It will be argued that this empirical evidence has far greater congruence with 
the arguments of subjectivist political economists than scholars whose work emphasises the 
deliberative potential of democratic decision-making.  
 
After this introduction, Part 2 will present the two alternative theoretical accounts of the 
capacity of politics and markets to facilitate inter-subjective learning to solve social 
problems. Part 3 will present an economic analysis of the problem of secondhand smoke 
and set out the empirical evidence from existing studies of the response of economic actors 
to this problem. Part 4 will examine the response of political actors to this problem via 
analysis of the legislative process that led to the English smoking ban. Part 5 will draw out 
the policy implications of this evidence. Part 6 will conclude.  
 
2. The claims of politics and the challenge of subjectivist political economy 
 
A fundamental claim of politics is that political processes enable reflection and deliberation 
on one’s own ‘deep’ values and on the values and preferences of others that is not possible 
in the economic realm. Politics is therefore said to facilitate inter-subjective learning – when 
one person learns about the subjective values and preferences of others. This deliberative 
dimension of politics is said to be a principal reason why political processes can produce 
qualitatively different outcomes, and it would be said superior outcomes, than economic 
processes.  
 
The notion that politics has a powerful deliberative potential is central to much scholarship 
in political philosophy and political science. At the heart of John Rawls’ contributions to 
political philosophy, for example, was the notion that within a political process people may 
reach an agreement about the terms of social cooperation that would not be possible in 
other institutional contexts. Rawls was concerned with the meta-framework within which 
more prosaic political and economic processes would operate, and in the case of the 
Original Position he offered a highly stylised and improbable account of political 
deliberation, but his work nevertheless exemplifies a widely-held assumption about the 
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outcomes that can emerge from self-reflection and inter-subjective learning in the political 
realm (Rawls, 1996, 1999a, 1999b).    
 
Beyond the collective agreement of an institutional meta-framework, it has been argued 
that reflective deliberation should be seen as the essence of all democratic decision-making. 
According to Dryzek (2000, p. 1): ‘The essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be 
deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights, or even self-
government’. The key characteristic of political deliberation, Dryzek (ibid) has argued, is that 
‘deliberators are amenable to changing their judgements, preferences and views during the 
course of their interactions, which involve persuasion, rather than coercion, manipulation, 
or deception’.    
 
Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson (1996, p. 2) have argued that the resolution of moral 
disagreements requires democratic deliberation in which citizens reason ‘beyond their 
narrow self-interest’ and reflect on the positions of those ‘people who reasonably disagree 
with them’.  For Gutmann and Thompson, only democratic processes offer the opportunity 
for the kind of reflective learning necessary to overcome the value-conflicts and moral 
disagreements likely to be part of any advanced, pluralist society.  
 
Democratic politics, then, is believed to offer the potential (though it is recognised that this 
potential is not always realised) for people to come together to set out their preferred 
solutions to social problems and to reflect on proposals put forward by others with different 
values and preferences. From this process it is believed that solutions to social problems 
that command widespread agreement can emerge and that such solutions are likely to be 
effective because they reflect what Rawls (1996, pp. 131-172) termed an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ – the agreement of a broad set of principles by a diverse population.  
 
It is claimed, then, that democracy has a transformative potential because it is only in a 
political context that people come together as citizens to discover common solutions to 
common problems. In the words of Barber (1984, p. 224), ‘it is as a citizen that the individual 
confronts the Other and adjusts his own life plans to the dictates of a shared world’, so that, 
‘The citizen does not define civic wants and needs; he develops common measures by which 
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private wants and needs can be transformed into public goods and ends’ (See also: 
Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Warren, 1992). 
 
The belief in the deliberative power of politics set out above involves an implicit and often 
explicit criticism of decision-making in the economic realm. Economic processes are seen to 
respond to individual purchasing decisions that are driven by hedonistic self-interest and 
reflect only those values and preferences that can be translated into monetary units. It is 
argued that other-regarding and non-pecuniary values and preferences will not be 
recognised in an economic context. According to Dryzek (2000, p. 155), markets may be 
considered ‘autistic’ because ‘they respond only to human, consumer preferences that can 
be couched in monetary terms’. Although it may be accepted that private markets are an 
efficient means of providing certain goods and services, it is nevertheless believed that such 
an ‘autistic’ mechanism is unlikely to be adept at fostering the inter-subjective learning 
necessary to the discovery of common solutions to social problems.  
 
This view of the deliberative potential of politics and the ‘autistic’ nature of markets has 
been challenged by political economists working within what I term here (following Evans 
(2009)) subjectivist political economy. Subjectivist political economy draws principally upon 
the traditions of Austrian economics and Virginian public choice theory. It utilises a broadly 
rational choice account of human action, but also emphasises the importance of expressive 
motives and ideas in influencing human behaviour. While there are undoubted tensions 
between Austrian and public choice approaches (Ikeda, 2003), there are also sufficient 
similarities to facilitate the broadly unified approach pursued in this and other work 
(Boettke and Lopez, 2002; Boettke, Coyne and Leeson, 2007; Buchanan and Vanberg, 2002; 
Evans, 2009).  
 
Subjectivist political economy places rivalrous competition at the centre of its account of the 
operation of a market economy: in the marketplace, different firms compete for custom and 
different individuals compete for positions within business enterprises. Two manufacturers 
may simultaneously launch competing models of MP3 player, for example, each hoping to 
win the custom of the finite number of potential customers. If one player sells in large 
numbers and the other does not, that outcome provides feedback about the preferences of 
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consumers and the success of each firm in meeting those preferences. It is via this process 
of rivalrous competition and feedback that information about people’s preferences, and the 
value of the resources that might be used to meet those preferences, is revealed. A firm or 
individual that does not reflect upon and learn from such information will not prosper in a 
market economy. In this way, the process of rivalrous competition is said to incentivise 
inter-subjective learning (Hayek, 1948a; Ikeda, 1997, Chapter 3; Lavoie, 1985, pp. 22-27; 
MacKenzie, 2008).  
 
An important difference between the information utilised in political decision-making and 
that utilised by economic actors is said to be that the former is limited to what can be 
verbally communicated and intellectually comprehended, whereas market prices are said to 
communicate information that may not be communicable verbally and may be beyond the 
comprehension of any one mind or group of minds working together. The information 
communicated by market prices reflects the billions of purchasing decisions made by 
consumers and producers dispersed throughout an advanced economy and may very often 
reflect tacit information that can only be revealed and hence communicated in the act of 
choosing. The ability of markets to utilise more information than political processes is said 
to be an important reason for the superior efficiency of market economies compared to 
planned economic systems (Hayek, 1948b; Ikeda, 1997, Chapter 3; Pennington 2003; 
Thomsen, 1992).   
 
Subjectivist political economy also claims that political decision-making tends to be 
characterised by exclusive, all-or-nothing choices, whereas markets allow for greater 
diversity, pluralism and polycentric experimentation. In the words of Buchanan (1979, p. 
56), ‘politics differs categorically from markets in that, in political competition, there are 
mutually exclusive sets of winners and losers’, meaning that, ‘in economic exchange, 
decisions are made at the margin, in terms of more or less, whereas in politics, decisions are 
made among mutually exclusive alternatives, in terms of all-or-none prospects’.  
 
It is argued that people may initially enter into politics to achieve gains from exchange not 
dissimilar those realised in private markets, such as the agreement of a common legal 
framework, but once the role of the state expands beyond the provision of genuine public 
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goods politics ceases to operate as a form of exchange for mutual advantage. Rather, the 
political process becomes the mechanism via which one group imposes their values and 
preferences on others. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962, p. 89) put it, democracy becomes 
the mechanism via which the majority exploit the minority: ‘the essence of the collective-
choice process under majority voting rules is the fact that the minority of voters are forced 
to accede to actions which they cannot prevent and for which they cannot claim 
compensation for damages resulting’.   
 
For subjectivist political economy, where choices are presented as mutually exclusive 
alternatives, and in the absence of unanimous decision-making, majorities (and in some 
cases minorities) are able to impose their own preferences on others, so that learning about 
the values and preferences of others in order to forge an overlapping-consensus would 
seem to be contra-indicated. Rather, criticising and undermining other people’s views would 
seem a more logical and effective strategy to secure the votes required to see one’s own 
preferences adopted as public policies (Buchanan, 1954, 1975, Chapter 5; Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1962, Chapter 3). 
 
The exclusive nature of political choices has also informed some accounts of the deliberative 
potential of democracy. Gutmann and Thompson (1996, pp. 15-16), for example, have 
argued that it is because public policies are binding upon all citizens that justifications for 
such policies that are acceptable to all should be sought via political deliberation. For 
subjectivist political economists, however, it is implausible to think that people would 
choose to engage in inter-subjective learning rather than pursue the non-cooperative 
strategy that offers the chance to win the political game outright and see one’s preferences 
translated undiluted into public policy (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, Chapter 4).  
 
According to the subjectivist account, then, political power is monopolistic, whereas power 
in a market economy is polycentric. Political decision-making processes may allow one 
group to impose their values or preferences on others, whereas in private markets a range 
of different alternatives can simultaneously co-exist. Success in politics may depend upon 
persuading people of the correctness of one’s own views and the fallacy of the views of 
others, whereas in a market economy individual success depends upon learning about and 
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responding to the values and preferences of others. Moreover, political deliberation is 
limited to that information that can be verbally communicated and consciously 
comprehended, whereas market prices enable economic actors to respond to knowledge 
that cannot be verbally communicated or intellectually comprehended.  
 
The following section will test these two accounts of politics and markets via the empirical 
example of the problem of smoking in enclosed public places. It should be noted, however, 
that the two positions as set out above are ideal-types some distance removed from the 
‘politics’ and ‘markets’ that exist in the real world: advocates of deliberative democracy 
would regard presently-existing democratic institutions as falling short of their democratic 
ideal; similarly, the markets that exist in contemporary capitalist societies are not free 
markets where outcomes are determined solely by market competition – government 
regulation and public policy exert a powerful influence on the outcomes generated within 
contemporary ‘market’ economies. Nevertheless, if empirical examples are to be used to 
explore theoretical positions than imperfect but presently existing cases must be employed. 
It is on this basis that the following case study aims to test the theoretical accounts 
presented above.  
 
3. The response of economic actors to the problem of secondhand smoke  
 
The fact that smoking is harmful to health was established more than sixty years ago (Doll 
and Hill, 1950) and that this harm extends to the inhalation of secondhand smoke (or 
environmental tobacco smoke) was established some thirty years later (Hirayama, 1981; 
Trichopoulos et al, 1981). Following the discovery of the harms caused by secondhand 
smoke, and campaigns by public health groups to disseminate that information, smoking in 
enclosed public places has ceased to be socially acceptable and has become constructed as 
a social problem (Berridge, 1999, 2007). In the language of economics, secondhand smoke is 
a negative externality: the harm to health that follows from the inhalation of secondhand 
smoke, as well as the more prosaic nuisance and irritation, constitute an external cost that 
smokers impose on people who share their airspace.  
 
9 
 
The removal of a negative externality is only optimal when the marginal social cost of 
removal is lower than the marginal social benefit of the activity that produces the 
externality. The ideal solution is for externalities to be internalised – that is, for the costs to 
be met by their creator while the social benefits remain. Subjectivist political economists 
would emphasise the fact that different people will view those costs and benefits 
differently: there is no single, objective cost or benefit of any action – only the cost or 
benefit as subjectively perceived by individual men and women (Buchanan, 1969; Vaughn 
1980). In the case of smoking in enclosed public places, for example, the costs of 
secondhand smoke may depend upon inter alia whether people are already smokers, their 
aversion to risk and the value they place on their health.  
 
Appreciation of the subjective nature of such costs and benefits logically leads to a Coasian 
approach to the problem of externalities. Coase (1960) famously predicted that private 
markets will internalise negative externalities when transaction costs are not prohibitive and 
property rights are clearly assigned. Coase’s Theorem classically involves a process of 
negotiation between the harmer and harmed until a level of compensation is agreed that is 
mutually advantageous to both parties. As long as the relevant parties are satisfied that the 
compensation paid is greater than the costs and less than the benefits of the relevant 
activity, then the externality can be said to have been internalised. Internalisation of the 
externality does not necessarily require direct financial compensation from harmer to 
harmed, however, but could involve the harmer agreeing to remove, limit or in some way 
ameliorate the externality, so that the preferences of both parties are reconciled.  
 
Littlechild (1986), Lee (1991) and Tollison and Wagner (1992) all hypothesised that the 
Coase Theorem could be applied to the problem of secondhand smoke in enclosed public 
places. It is argued that the ease with which smokers and non-smokers can be separated in 
public places suggests that where competitive pressures exist, commercial enterprises will 
cater to the demands of both smokers and non-smokers. Hence, in bars and restaurants 
where public authorities do not regulate or restrict smoking: 
 
[O]wners determine what smoking policies are consistent with maximum profits by 
taking into account the competing demands of smoking and non-smoking 
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customers. More air space will be smoke-free as non-smokers out-bid smokers, 
and vice versa. Whether owners cater solely to smokers, to non-smokers, or 
accommodate both, depends on customer preferences and the marginal costs of 
accommodation (Dunham and Marlow, 2003, pp. 1936-1937) 
 
It is predicted, then, that self-interested bar and restaurant owners will be incentivised by 
commercial pressures to cater to the needs of as wide a range of customers as possible; the 
problematisation of secondhand smoke should lead economic actors to supply smokefree 
hospitality and cater to the demands of smoking customers.  
 
This approach to the problem has been criticised by Alamar and Glantz (2007), who have 
claimed that it is not possible for private arrangements to internalise the negative 
externalities created by second-hand smoke because, ‘There is no mechanism by which a 
restaurant owner can compensate a patron for any health costs related to second-hand 
smoke’, so, ‘it is not possible for the owner to have completely internalized the costs of the 
externality imposed by the smoker’ (Alamar and Glantz, 2007, p. 292). 
 
This objection, however, misunderstands the subjective nature of the costs involved. As 
noted above, the cost of the externality imposed by secondhand smoke is not a single given 
cost that can be objectively determined, but a cost that represents the subjective harm 
imposed, in terms of nuisance, irritation and (surely most important) long-term risk of ill-
health. This cost can only be discovered by a heuristic process of negotiation between 
harmer and harmed, in the same way that the price of a good or service can only be 
determined heuristically via negotiation between producers and consumers in the 
marketplace.  
 
As also noted above, it is possible to internalise externalities without pecuniary 
compensation. Hence, the transaction costs of direct compensation payments are likely to 
be prohibitive in this instance, so it is more likely that the externality will be internalised via 
an accommodation between harmer (smoker) and harmed (non-smoker), for example 
through the provision of separate smoking and non-smoking areas or adequate ventilation 
inside bars and restaurants. If non-smokers do not believe that such accommodations 
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adequately address the costs imposed by secondhand smoke then they may choose not to 
patronise the bar or restaurant, thus imposing costs (loss of income) on the business owner.  
 
A number of empirical studies support the view that an accommodation along the lines 
envisaged by Coase existed in bars and restaurants prior to the introduction of smoking 
bans. Boyes and Marlow’s (1996) study of provision for smokers and non-smokers in 
restaurants and bars in the Californian town of San Luis Obispo before it became the first 
town in the world to introduce a smoking ban found that the majority of bars and 
restaurants made provision for smokers and non-smokers, usually by setting aside separate 
smoking and non-smoking areas. This research also found that the majority of non-smoking 
patrons were satisfied with the pre-ban arrangements.  
 
Empirical research by Dunham and Marlow (2000a, 2000b) similarly found that private 
markets supplied a plurality of arrangements to respond to the diverse preferences of 
smoking and non-smoking bar and restaurant customers. A national US survey of 1,300 bar 
and restaurant owners found that restaurants allocated 54 per cent of seating to non-
smoking areas, while in bars 5 per cent of seating was so allocated. Significantly, it was 
found that the percentage of seating allocated to non-smoking areas was negatively 
correlated to the proportion of smokers in the local population, indicating that restaurant 
and bar owners were responding to commercial pressures in the allocation of smoking and 
non-smoking areas (Dunham and Marlow, 2000a).  
 
Indeed, Dunham and Marlow (2000b) found that the 39% of restaurant owners and 83% of 
bar owners believed (rightly or wrongly) that legislation to ban smoking in their premises 
would lower their revenue, demonstrating the importance of self-interest and commercial 
pressures to their decision to accommodate the interests of smokers and non-smokers.  
 
Similar evidence of a diversity of owner responses to commercial pressures from smoking 
and non-smoking clients was found by an empirical study of close to one thousand 
restaurants and bars in the US state of Wisconsin, which at the time of the study had few 
restrictions on smoking in public places (Dunham and Marlow, 2004). The study found that 
18 per cent of restaurants and almost no bars in the state were completely smoke-free, 
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while 45 per cent of restaurants and two per cent of bars did not allow smoking in the 
majority of their premises.  The proportion of seats allocated to smoking and non-smoking 
customers was linked to a wide range of factors, including the number of smokers in the 
local community, the type of restaurant, presence of children and geographical location. The 
authors concluded that the diversity of smoking arrangements produced in the private 
market reflected the pluralism of consumer preferences and the diverse business challenges 
that faced different restaurants and bars in Wisconsin (Dunham and Marlow, 2004).  
 
It should be noted that none of the above studies explicitly discuss the question of 
hospitality sector employees – as will be discussed in the following section, one argument 
for smoking bans is that bar and restaurant employees do not have the same choice as to 
whether or not to visit a particular establishment and inhale secondhand smoke as 
customers. Of course, it may be presumed that the Coase Theorem logically also applies to 
the employees of bars and restaurants: in the absence of monopsony employment, bar and 
restaurant workers freely negotiate their terms of employment and logically only enter into 
a contract where the benefits of employment exceed the costs, including exposure to 
secondhand smoke. However, the empirical evidence that might prove or disprove such a 
presumption does not exist as no such studies have been undertaken.  
 
There is, then, empirical evidence to support the view that economic actors successfully 
internalised the problem of secondhand smoke in enclosed public places. Property rights 
within bars and restaurants were clearly assigned to the owners1 and transaction costs were 
low because owners had a strong incentive to ‘negotiate’ on behalf of smokers and non-
smokers to achieve a commercially optimal accommodation of different preferences.  
 
The power of exit in a competitive market meant that self-interested bar and restaurant 
owners had a strong incentive to cater to the preferences of as many people as possible. 
These factors resulted in the creation of niche markets that catered only for non-smokers, 
relatively larger markets catering for smokers and non-smokers who were more agnostic 
about the costs of second-hand smoke, and the largest market that catered separately but 
within the same establishment for smokers and non-smokers.  
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Analysis of the response of economic actors to the problem of secondhand smoke in 
enclosed public places supports the view that participation in the economic realm 
incentivises inter-subjective learning. Of course, smokers and non-smokers did not 
deliberately set out their preferences to bar and restaurant owners who consciously 
reflected on them and then adopted smoking policies accordingly. Rather, it was the price 
signals generated in the marketplace that communicated the subjective preferences of 
smoking and non-smoking consumers – information that could not have been verbally 
communicated or consciously comprehended.   
 
4. Political actors and the problem of secondhand smoke: the case of the English smoking 
ban 
 
The evidence presented in the previous section showed how bar and restaurant owners 
responded to the problem of secondhand smoke, usually via the provision of separate 
smoking and non-smoking areas to meet the demands of smoking and non-smoking 
customers. Despite the evidence that such accommodations successfully internalised the 
externality created by secondhand smoke, legislation has been introduced throughout the 
developed world to ban smoking in enclosed public places: in the past decade almost every 
European country, most US states and Canadian provinces, Australia, New Zealand, Hong 
Kong and Japan, have all prohibited smoking in enclosed public places.  
 
These smoking bans would certainly seem to be examples of the kind of top-down, exclusive 
solutions to social problems that subjectivist political economy would envisage being 
produced by political processes. In order to more fully understand the political decision-
making processes that led to the introduction of such policies this section will now analyse 
the legislative process that led to the smoking ban passed by the UK Parliament on 14 
February 2006 that came into force in England on 1 July 2007.2   
 
The UK Parliament that introduced the English smoking ban was elected at the 2005 General 
Election when the Labour Party won a House of Commons majority of 66 MPs. The Labour 
Party election manifesto contained a commitment to ban smoking in restaurants and bars 
that served food, with an exemption for private members’ clubs. Hence, according to this 
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proposal, smoking would continue to be permitted in bars that did not serve food. This 
manifesto commitment was the spur to an inquiry into smoking in enclosed public places by 
the House of Commons Health Select Committee at the start of the new Parliament.  
 
The Health Select Committee was made up of 11 MPs drawn from all the main UK political 
parties. Its inquiry had many of the characteristics of a deliberative process: written 
evidence was invited from members of the public, public health groups, government bodies, 
environmental health professionals, tobacco manufacturers and representatives of the 
hospitality industry; a small number of representatives of the public health profession, and 
the tobacco and hospitality industries, were also invited to give oral evidence to the 
Committee. This evidence informed a unanimous all-party report that recommended a 
complete ban on smoking in all enclosed public places, including bars, restaurants and 
private members’ clubs (House of Commons Health Select Committee, 2005a). Cairney 
(2009, p. 478) has identified this report as being crucial in persuading the government to 
abandon its manifesto commitment to a partial ban and allow a free vote on the legislation 
in the House of Commons on 14 February 2006.  This debate was therefore a rare occasion 
when the outcome of a Parliamentary vote that was not determined by party political 
affiliation. The legislation was passed by a large majority of 453 to 125 votes, although it is 
worth noting that the debate was even more one-sided than the voting statistics might 
suggest as only a handful of MPs spoke against the proposed legislation.  
 
The Select Committee inquiry and the House of Commons debate would appear to be 
important deliberative moments in the legislative process that led to the English smoking 
ban. The existence of such forums would seem to support the contention that political 
decision-making offers opportunities for reflective deliberation and inter-subjective 
learning. However, a more thorough analysis of what actually happened in each instance 
casts doubt upon such an interpretation.  
 
The Select Committee inquiry received 56 written submissions and heard three days of oral 
evidence. However, analysis of the official transcript of the Select Committee proceedings 
and the final report suggest that this was not a deliberative process in which people sought 
to listen to and learn from different views. Rather, it would appear that the members of the 
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Select Committee had a pre-determined view that the issue of smoking in enclosed public 
places was one of irreconcilable conflicting interests: on one side were the interests of 
smokers whose only concern was their ‘right’ to smoke and the hospitality and tobacco 
industries who sought to maximise their profits; on the other side were the interests of the 
innocent victims of passive smoking. 
 
The transcript of the oral evidence shows that the proceedings were more akin to judicial 
cross-examination than a deliberative process. Indeed, those who presented oral evidence 
were formally described as ‘witnesses’ to be ‘examined’ (House of Commons Health Select 
Committee, 2005c). Those who attended the Committee to argue against an outright ban on 
smoking in enclosed public places were met with hostile questioning in which their motives 
were challenged, while a number of those who presented views more sympathetic to a ban 
were asked why they had not done more to see a ban introduced (For example: House of 
Commons Health Select Committee, 2005c, Ev 5-7, Ev 17-23).  
 
The questioning of the witnesses appeared to reflect the members’ view that there was a 
moral correct side of the argument; those who were on the wrong side of the argument 
should be exposed, while those whose views were ambiguous should be required to make a 
choice between the two sides. For example, a senior civil servant in the Department of 
Health was asked: ‘Is it therefore your opinion, or the opinion of your legal advisors, that the 
human rights of a smoker outweigh the human rights of a non-smoker? Yes or no’. When 
this question met with an equivocal reply, it was repeated in similarly stark terms: ‘Who has 
the greatest human right, the smoker or the non-smoker, because it cannot be both?’ 
(House of Commons Health Select Committee, 2005c, Ev 6).  
 
The Select Committee report (2005a, p. 20) similarly stated that the task facing legislators 
was: ‘balancing the economic effects on businesses and smokers’ rights against workers’ 
[exposed to secondhand smoke] rights’. The report (2005a, p. 6) summarised the ‘ways of 
dealing with such effects [of secondhand smoke]’ as simply ‘ventilation or ban’. Even though 
the written evidence submitted by one tobacco industry representative had argued that it 
was possible to ‘[allow] choice for both smokers and non-smokers’ (House of Commons 
Health Select Committee, 2005b, Ev 14), and a similar perspective had been presented by 
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tobacco industry representatives in their oral evidence (House of Commons Health Select 
Committee, 2005c, Ev 18), this possibility was entirely absent from the report.  
 
A similar adversarial approach to the problem was expressed by contributors to the House 
of Commons debate.  Speaking in the debate, the Chair of the Select Committee gave the 
following characterisation of the issue:  
 
The tobacco industry and its allies often argue that smoke-free laws are an 
infringement of liberty, but I suggest that, once it is accepted that breathing in 
other people's smoke is dangerous to health, we will recognise that we are really 
dealing with a conflict of interest (Hansard, Column 1321). 
 
Likewise, the Conservative opposition health spokesperson ended his contribution by 
drawing attention to the conflict between the interests of smokers and non-smokers:  
 
[T]he principles involved are pretty straightforward. We must reduce smoking and 
the exposure to second-hand smoke. We should not permit people's liberty to 
choose whether to smoke to extend to a licence to cause harm to others (Column 
1305). 
 
An important dimension of this ‘conflictual’ approach was the belief that bar and restaurant 
employees had no plausible alternative but to undertake such work. The Select Committee 
report (2005a, p. 3) stated that ‘The primary justification for a ban on smoking in public 
places and workplaces is that it protects workers and other vulnerable groups from the 
significant health risks which SHS [secondhand smoke] poses’. The report dismissed the 
notion that bar workers could choose to work in an environment without exposure to 
secondhand smoke:  
 
There is little alternative to bar work for some people, such as students and single 
parents, who need the flexible arrangements and local availability the job offers... 
the argument that workers can choose where to work and therefore can decide 
whether to take on health risks goes against the grain of most legislation to protect 
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workers. The same point could have been made about child chimney sweeps 
(House of Commons Health Select Committee, 2005a, pp. 19-20). 
 
Throughout the House of Commons debate, then, MPs argued in favour of the proposed 
legislation on the grounds that it provided ‘protection’ from the harmful effects of 
secondhand smoke for hospitality industry workers, as well as members of the public 
(Columns 1295, 1301, 1304, 1312, 1313, 1315, 1317, 1321, 1327, 1330, 1333).  
 
The Select Committee inquiry and the House of Commons debate had many of the surface 
characteristics of a deliberative process. In particular, there was an attempt to provide 
justificatory reasons for the introduction of the smoking ban in terms of developing a robust 
argument in favour of the policy. A deeper analysis of what actually took place, however, 
reveals very little evidence of genuine deliberation. The political actors who participated in 
both interpreted the problem of smoking in enclosed public places in conflictual terms and 
this reflected the adversarial approach that was then taken. The notion that the different 
actors might have something to learn from one another, or might benefit from reflective 
deliberation, was entirely absent from both contexts.  
 
It should also be noted that whereas economic processes had clear feedback mechanisms in 
terms of profits and losses, the political process did not provide similarly direct feedback: 
the politicians who introduced the ban on smoking enclosed public places would not face re-
election for a number of years and any future election would be determined by a wide 
range of issues – the question of smoking in enclosed public places was unlikely to figure 
prominently, let alone prove decisive, at the next General Election.  
 
Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that from this process emerged an exclusive, all-
or-nothing solution that saw the interests of one group – non-smokers entirely intolerant of 
secondhand smoke – imposed on all.  
 
5. Politics, policy and information  
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The case of secondhand smoke in enclosed public places provides an example of the 
different solutions to social problems produced by economic and political processes: 
economic processes produced a pluralistic outcome, allowing for a variety of 
accommodations depending upon local circumstances and choices; political processes 
produced a uniform smoking ban that did not allow local variance or choice.  
 
At the heart of these two different solutions were very different communicative processes. 
The political process utilised only information that could be verbally articulated or 
intellectually comprehended – values and preferences that could not be verbally articulated 
or consciously comprehended were excluded from this process. By contrast, the economic 
process was driven by people responding to non-verbal information in the form of price 
signals generated by the market. Subjectivist political economists would suggest that these 
price signals contained a huge amount of extremely complex information about people’s 
relative preferences for smoking and non-smoking bars and restaurants, and the costs they 
were prepared to incur, and the trade-offs they were willing to make, in order to enjoy the 
benefits of different smoking and non-smoking arrangements. In an economic context prices 
provided a clear feedback mechanism about the success or failure of different arrangements 
that was absent from the political process.  
 
It would appear, then, that the empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions of 
subjectivist political economy. An important objection to this conclusion, however, is that 
the failure of one particular political process to facilitate inter-subjective learning does not 
necessarily mean that all political processes will similarly fail. Indeed, advocates of more 
deliberative models of democracy often recognise the failure of contemporary democratic 
institutions and practices to deliver genuine reflective deliberation. The solution to this 
failure of democracy is then said to be the introduction of ‘thicker’ or ‘deeper’ democratic 
institutions that place greater emphasis on deliberation and seek to remove barriers to 
wider political participation so that more people can contribute to the deliberative process. 
The pathologies of democracy, then, are said to be remedied by ‘more’ democracy in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms (Barber, 1984, Chapter 5; Dryzek, 2000, Chapter 1).  
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From the perspective of subjectivist political economy, however, these arguments miss the 
central point that no conscious communicative process can access the information that is 
generated and used within in private markets. Because this information is beyond verbal 
articulation or conscious comprehension it must always be absent from political decision-
making. The subjectivist critique of political deliberation, then, concerns intrinsic features of 
the process itself. Indeed, if deliberation cannot work in a committee of eleven people, or a 
legislature of 646 people, it is not clear why ‘thicker’ or ‘deeper’ deliberation, which would 
seem to imply more people engaging in a longer deliberative process, should fare any better 
(Pennington, 2003).  
 
A second, linked objection to the contention that the evidence above supports the 
conclusions of subjectivist political economy may be that political decision-making within 
largely autonomous local authorities can replicate the processes of feedback-driven inter-
subjective learning seen within private markets. Tiebout (1956) and Vihanto (1992) have 
argued that genuinely autonomous local authorities providing relatively discreet packages of 
goods and services could produce a competitive process similar to that in private markets: 
people would reveal their preferences by moving from one local authority jurisdiction to 
another and this geographic mobility would incentivise local authorities to respond to these 
revealed preferences in order to attract residents-taxpayers.  
 
The claim that political decision-making by autonomous local authorities drive by residents-
taxpayers exercising a right of exit provides greater opportunities for pluralism, polycentric 
experimentation and the use of dispersed information compared to political decision-
making by a unitary, centralised state would seem to be well-founded. Certainly, from the 
perspective of subjectivist political economy, the supply of goods and services by 
autonomous local government must be deemed preferable to the supply of goods and 
service by unitary central government (Pennington, 2003, pp. 735-736; Vihanto, 1992).  
 
However, it is important to note that what is proposed here is to give political decision-
making more of the characteristics of economic decision-making, in terms of rivalrous 
competition and the utilisation of subjective, dispersed and tacit knowledge, rather than to 
make political deliberation work on its own terms. Hence, this argument does not offer any 
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reason to believe that political decision-making should not be considered second-best to 
economic decision-making. Rather, what is argued here is that politics should adopt the 
institutional characteristics and practices of markets.  
 
Furthermore, as Vihanto (1992) acknowledged, there are frequently strong centralising 
forces within the political process that mean that pluralism is often not tolerated in the 
political realm. In the case of the smoking ban, for example, the interpretation of the 
problem by political actors as one of conflicting interests logically led to the imposition of an 
outright ban; a pluralistic outcome that would have implied some concession to what were 
perceived to be malign and/or selfish interests was surely not acceptable to the relevant 
political actors. Hence, the dynamics of politics may lead to centralisation more than 
localisation.  
 
Accordingly, from the perspective of subjectivist political economy economic mechanisms 
should be used as the principal means of solving social problems. This would imply, then, a 
redrawing of the balance between what are considered public problems of government 
concern and private problems of concern to individuals, families and firms. In the words of 
MacKenzie (2008, p. 687): ‘the only legitimate role for conscious deliberation over activist 
public policy and social reform is a simple recognition that we should not deliberate over 
these matters at all’.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article has utilised a case study of the responses of economic and political actors to the 
problem of secondhand smoke in enclosed public places to explore the different outcomes 
produced by economic and political processes. In this case, economic processes produced 
an accommodation of a wide range of interests in the form of varied provision for smokers 
and non-smokers, whereas political processes produced an outright ban that would seem to 
favour one particular set of preferences. 
 
Although caution should be exercised before drawing general, definitive conclusions from a 
single case study, the empirical evidence here has far greater congruence with the 
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arguments of subjectivist political economy than the arguments of advocates of democratic 
deliberation; the evidence presented here supports the conclusion that markets are 
superior to political processes in enabling inter-subjective learning in order to produce 
solutions to social problems that reflect the values and preferences of the diverse members 
of a complex, advanced society.  
 
If these conclusions are correct, then they would suggest that popular empowerment, 
understood in terms of the realisation of people’s values and preferences, is more likely to 
be achieved via economic processes than via political processes.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In this sense, the notion that these bars and restaurants were enclosed ‘public’ places is a 
misnomer. However, this terminology has been used throughout this article for consistency 
with almost all other contemporary accounts of the subject which use this (admittedly 
flawed) terminology. The introduction of smoking bans effectively assigned the relevant 
property rights to non-smokers. 
 
2 In accordance with the post-devolution constitutional settlement, the UK Parliament voted 
to ban smoking in England, following the enactment of similar legislation for Scotland by the 
Scottish Government and for Wales by the Welsh Assembly. 
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